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Abstract
This paper presents our solutions to some problems we encountered in an ongoing attempt to verify the
micro-hypervisor currently developed within the Robin project. The problems that we discuss are (1) eﬃ-
cient automatic reasoning for type-correct programs in virtual memory, and (2) modeling memory-mapped
devices with alignment requirements. The discussed solutions are integrated in our veriﬁcation environment
for operating-system kernels in the interactive theorem prover PVS. This veriﬁcation environment will ul-
timately be used for the veriﬁcation of the Robin micro-hypervisor. As a proof of concept we include an
example veriﬁcation of a very simple piece of code in our environment.
Keywords: operating-system kernel, micro-hypervisor, virtual memory, memory-mapped devices, formal
veriﬁcation
1 Introduction
The programming environment of operating-system kernels diﬀers in essential ways
from that of application programs. The most prominent diﬀerences are direct hard-
ware access and privileged processor instructions. In addition, certain situations
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that are absurd from an application-programming point of view are possible (and
sometimes even very common) in kernel programming. For instance, many kernels
see some piece of main memory at diﬀerent virtual addresses. (Other important
ways in which kernel programming diﬀers are the use of casts and pointer arith-
metic, however, those are outside the main scope of this paper.)
The additional hardware features that are exploited in a kernel programming
environment are usually subject to very speciﬁc programming rules, which are de-
scribed in the hardware architecture’s technical documentation. Typically the rules
are not enforced and, when not obeyed, one might get bugs that are hard to repro-
duce. As a consequence certain kinds of bugs can only occur in kernels (or similar
kinds of low-level systems).
In the following we use the term kernel-programming features to refer to the
additional phenomena of kernel programming just described. A veriﬁcation envi-
ronment for kernel code must of course model the kernel-programming features in
order to give a semantics to the code. Less immediate but equally important is,
however, that the veriﬁcation environment is faithful with respect to the possible
bugs associated with kernel-programming features. With faithful we mean here
that any such bug must with certainty lead to a veriﬁcation failure. The subtle
diﬀerences between valid and erroneous code make the design of the veriﬁcation
environment very challenging.
In this paper we discuss our approach to model certain kernel-programming
features that are used in the Robin micro-hypervisor. The solutions presented here
are already implemented in our veriﬁcation environment. The presentation includes
a discussion of the kinds of programming errors that our models are able and are
not able to catch. We focus on the memory peculiarities in this paper and present
the following two points:
• A model of virtual memory that captures virtual-memory aliases, permits the
veriﬁcation of page-table modiﬁcations and eﬃcient reasoning about well-behaved
code (Section 3).
• A general model for memory-mapped devices and the phenomena of reserved bits
in certain hardware registers (Section 4).
In addition, Section 2 gives a general overview of our veriﬁcation environment, and
Section 5 contains a veriﬁcation example.
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This section provides some details about our veriﬁ-
cation environment for the Robin micro-hypervisor,
see Figure 1 for illustration. More technical informa-
tion can be obtained from [8], while the context of
the Robin project is described in [6]. Our approach
relies on source-code veriﬁcation in the interactive
theorem prover PVS [5]. The input language of PVS
is higher-order logic enriched with predicate subtyp-
ing and some other forms of dependent types. For
the veriﬁcation we model parts of the IA32 hard-
ware and the semantics of C++ data types inside PVS. These two models provide
the basic operations for a model of the micro-hypervisor. Then we use the prover
component of PVS to establish theorems about the model. Technically we show
Φdata types , Φhardware  ϕ(hypervisor),
where ϕ is one property from the hypervisor speciﬁcation, such as termination
without runtime type errors. Our veriﬁcation results will describe properties of the
source code. A formal lifting of the results to object code (which would eliminate
the correctness of the compiler from our assumptions) is planned for the future.
Figure 2 depicts the data ﬂow of our veriﬁcation approach. A semantics compiler
translates the C++ source code into its semantics in higher-order logic in PVS.
The semantics compiler is currently developed on the basis of the Elsa/Olmar C++
front-end [7] and will be described elsewhere. The basic building blocks of the C++
semantics are provided by the hardware model and the data-type semantics.
The operations in the hardware model as well as the data-type semantics and the
semantics of C++ fragments are uniformly modeled as state transformers. State
transformers come in two ﬂavors: statement state transformers (for C++ state-
ments) and expression state transformers (for C++ expressions and everything else).
An expression state transformer is a function of type
State →ExprResult[State, Data].
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Here State is the type of all possible states of the hardware model, and Data is a
type parameter for the result of the state transformer (if it terminates successfully).
Both types are theory parameters in our PVS formalization, making them eﬀec-
tively polymorphic. In the veriﬁcation of concrete C++ programs however, Data is
instantiated with a ﬁxed type for each state transformer. The State parameter is
either instantiated as well (if we verify against a concrete hardware model), or left
polymorphic if we verify against the plain-memory speciﬁcation (see Section 3) in
general. The type ExprResult is deﬁned as follows:
ExprResult[State, Data : Type] : Datatype
BEGIN
OK(state: State, data: Data) : OK?
Exception(ex type : Exception type, state : State) : Exception?
Fatal : Fatal?
Hang : Hang?
END ExprResult
This piece of PVS code deﬁnes ExprResult as a disjoint union with four variants
tagged OK, Exception, Fatal and Hang. The identiﬁers with question marks are rec-
ognizer predicates for the corresponding variants (e.g., OK? is true on OK(· · ·) and
false on the other three variants). The identiﬁers state, data, ex type are (partial)
accessor functions (e.g., state(OK(s, −)) = s).
A state-transformer result of the form OK(s, d) models successful termination
with successor state s and result d. Hang stands for non-termination, for instance
because of a while loop or a page fault that keeps occurring at the same instruction.
Fatal is reserved for unrecoverable errors, which we want to rule out by veriﬁcation.
A result of the form Exception models hardware exceptions and interrupts that will
be handled by the micro-kernel. 5
Statement state transformers have the form [State →StmtResult[State, Data]]
with a very similar type StmtResult. The main diﬀerence between ExprResult and
StmtResult is that StmtResult contains abnormalities like Break and Return to model
the corresponding C++ control-ﬂow statements, very similar to [3]. Further, OK
does not carry a data element. The parameter of type Data is used inside Return to
model the return type of C++ functions.
State transformers can be composed in the obvious way. For two state trans-
formers f and g their composition f ## g is a state transformer that performs the
eﬀect of g on the successor state of f if f returns OK. Otherwise g is discarded and
the result of f is the result of the composition. If f is an expression transformer,
the data in any OK result is discarded.
The ﬁrst base component of our veriﬁcation environment, the hardware model,
formalizes an abstract model of the IA32 hardware in PVS. It provides physical
memory, virtual memory with address translation via page tables, and much more.
The hardware model does not blindly implement the behavior of the real hardware.
Instead certain subtle programming errors that would cause the real CPU to do
5 Exception does not model C++ exceptions. We consider C++ exceptions too heavyweight to be used in
an operating-system kernel. Therefore they are outside the fragment of C++ treated in this paper.
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nonsense yield unprovable proof obligations in the hardware model. For instance,
the attempt to interpret a string as a page-table entry yields a proof obligation
that remains unprovable unless a suitable data-type conversion is formalized as an
axiom. (Of course such an axiom is not justiﬁed.) This kind of error checking even
works for hardware-initiated page-table traversals during address translation.
The memory formalization in the hardware model is split into diﬀerent layers
of memory models, for instance for physical and virtual memory. These diﬀerent
memory models share a common interface. Every memory model deﬁnes a type
State of possible states and the following record of operations.
Memory struct : Type = [#
memory read : [Address → [State →ExprResult[State, Byte]]],
memory write : [Address, Byte → [State →ExprResult[State, Unit]]],
... #]
The two operations respectively read and write one byte at the given address. Note
that reading in memory can change the memory (for instance set the accessed bits
in the page table). The memory structure contains two additional operations for
modeling memory-mapped devices and reserved bits, see Section 4.
In order to get a uniform treatment of memory-mapped devices and the special
eﬀects of feature ﬂags in CPU control registers, we decided to have a uniform address
space for both memory and registers. The type Address is therefore deﬁned as a
record consisting of a Register Id and an oﬀset:
Address : Type = [# type of : Register Id, oﬀset : nat #]
Real memory appears as a (rather big) special register with Register Id Mem. For
memory the oﬀset is the real address. For hardware registers the oﬀset will most
often be 0, however, for processor architectures featuring partial register access,
the oﬀset might be positive (e.g., for accessing AH one would use oﬀset 1 in EAX).
The sizes and possible oﬀsets of hardware registers are enforced with suitable side
eﬀects, see Section 4.
On top of the memory structure we deﬁne the following two functions for ac-
cessing contiguous blocks of memory for every memory model in the obvious way.
memory write list :
[Memory struct → [Address, list[Byte] → [State →ExprResult[State, Unit]]]]
memory read list :
[Memory struct → [Address, nat → [State →ExprResult[State, list[Byte]]]]]
Our second base component, the semantics of data types, provides a suitable
semantics for all C++ types and all necessary hardware data types (such as page-
table entries). It exploits under-speciﬁcation to make the detection of erroneous
type casts and wrong implicit type conversions possible (like, for instance, reading
data from a union with the wrong type) [2]. The data-type semantics is indepen-
dent of any memory model. It provides operations to convert data from and to
their object representation, which is of type list[Byte]. Writing and reading the
object representation into and out of memory is done with the above functions
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memory write list and memory read list.
In our design, the three base components—hardware model, data types, and
C++ semantics—are relatively independent of each other. It is therefore possible
• to add new operations to the hardware model,
• to use diﬀerent versions of the hardware model for diﬀerent parts of the hypervi-
sor; the boot code of the hypervisor can, for instance, be veriﬁed against physical
memory,
• to add additional axioms to the data types, e.g. to model compiler-speciﬁc as-
sumptions about the size of some data types or the precise behavior of some type
casts, and
• to adopt the semantics of new C++ features or compiler-speciﬁc C++ constructs.
Our hardware model and the C++ semantics are necessarily incomplete. Many
of the omissions however do not lead to global assumptions on the validity of our
veriﬁcation. The hardware model, for instance, does not contain virtual 8086 mode,
but the validity of our veriﬁcation does not hinge on the absence of instructions that
enable virtual 8086 mode. Instead the VM ﬂag, which controls this mode, is protected
with a suitable side eﬀect (see Section 4). Any attempt to enable virtual 8086 mode
will yield a Fatal result. Hence a proof of normal termination suﬃces to show that
virtual 8086 mode is never enabled. Similarly, the use of missing features in the
C++ semantics will trigger an assertion in the semantics compiler.
For a number of features currently not present in our veriﬁcation environment,
we plan inclusion in the future. These features are (1) the Translation Lookaside
Buﬀer (TLB) 6 , (2) cache policy checking for devices, (3) segment oﬀsets and seg-
ment size checking, (4) linking object code and instruction fetch to the abstract
C++ semantics. Because of their absence we are currently unable to detect certain
kinds of errors, namely
• TLB errors, e.g. inconsistencies between the TLB and the page tables, or implicit
assumptions about the TLB size and structure,
• segment violations (the Robin micro-hypervisor uses a ﬂat memory model where
no segment violations can occur, however, currently we do not check that the
segment descriptors are ﬁlled with the proper values),
• cache policy errors for memory-mapped devices, and delayed side eﬀects for
cachable memory-mapped devices, 7
• discrepancies between our C++ semantics and the compiled object code, which
(apart from compiler bugs) could occur for the following reasons: volatile-related
errors in the source code 8 , certain compiler optimizations (e.g. delayed write-back
6 The TLB is a special CPU-internal cache for virtual-to-physical address translations.
7 The source code that we currently target does not involve any devices. In general, cache policy checking
for memory-mapped devices is trivial to add with our mechanism for side eﬀects (see Section 4). To model
cache eﬀects on cachable devices, the model of the device should include the relevant cache eﬀects.
8 A C++ compiler is permitted to perform arbitrary optimizations with respect to non-volatile data. Mem-
ory accesses to such data are not part of the observable behavior of a C++ program, which makes a correct
semantics diﬃcult. At the moment our C++ semantics treats all data as volatile. A veriﬁcation based on
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to memory), or self-modifying code (however, no self-modifying code is contained
in our current veriﬁcation target).
Once these missing features have been added, our veriﬁcation will build on the
following general assumptions:
• The software to be veriﬁed will be executed on a single-processor system.
• Caches for real memory are working completely transparent and can be ignored.
This should be guaranteed by the hardware on single-processor systems.
• The involved software tools—the C++ compiler used to compile the Robin micro-
hypervisor, our semantics compiler (including the Elsa C++ parser and type
checker), and PVS—produce correct results.
3 The Plain-Memory Abstraction
The memory in an IA32 system is a sophisticated device: segments and page tables
specify access rights, a given piece of memory might be visible in diﬀerent virtual-
address ranges, the address translation in the CPU from virtual to physical addresses
might diﬀer from what is speciﬁed in the page table because of bogus TLB entries,
and much more. We cannot ignore all these eﬀects, not even for most innocent
kernel code, because of the errors that they might cause.
As a consequence we designed the plain-memory abstraction for the veriﬁcation
of those parts of the kernel that require only the standard C++ memory model. It
deals with the following issues.
• Writing or reading a single byte in memory can have devastating eﬀects if one hits
a memory-mapped device, a page table or simply an unmapped address. For cor-
rectness, the veriﬁcation must therefore be carried out against a faithful model of
IA32 memory. Plain memory provides a (comparatively) simple abstraction that
can be used for those parts of the sources that only need well-behaved memory
without special eﬀects.
• The IA32 hardware provides several memory conﬁgurations: real-address mode,
protected mode with and without paging. Our hardware model multiplies the
number of diﬀerent memories because we prefer to model diﬀerent memory fea-
tures (such as the TLB or execution of the page-fault handler) in diﬀerent mem-
ory models. Most of the code does not depend on a concrete memory model and
should consequently be veriﬁed against a suitable set of memory models. Plain
memory permits precisely this because every memory model of interest will give
rise to a model of plain memory.
Technically plain memory is a speciﬁcation that provides byte-wise read and
write access to memory, where special properties are guaranteed for read-blessed
and read/write-blessed address regions. (There are additional operations to access
side eﬀects of memory-mapped devices and to enforce reserved bits. We ignore
the current semantics will therefore not catch missing volatile annotations or missing memory fences.
H. Tews et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 79–96 85
these things here, see Section 4 for details.) The general idea is simple. Memory
at blessed addresses is sane: read access does not change anything in the blessed
address range, and write access only changes the bytes written (in the expected
way). Moreover, these special properties are maintained as long as only blessed
addresses are accessed. No guarantees are made however for a memory access
outside the blessed address regions. We have shown in PVS that these properties
are satisﬁed by normal virtual memory (that is outside memory-mapped devices)
under the following preconditions:
• All blessed addresses are mapped in the page table, and no two diﬀerent
read/write-blessed addresses are mapped to the same physical address. (Diﬀerent
read-blessed addresses might refer to the same physical address, and there might
also exist other mappings for addresses outside the blessed address regions.)
• The page tables can only be read-blessed if the accessed and dirty bits are set.
(This condition can be relaxed for page-table entries of read-blessed or unblessed
memory.)
We want the plain-memory speciﬁcation to be usable with all concrete memory
models (including physical real-address memory). Therefore the speciﬁcation must
describe all properties only with the observations that can be made by reading and
writing single bytes. In PVS the speciﬁcation is split into a record of functions
(capturing the plain-memory signature) and a predicate for the required properties.
With this technique the axioms of the plain-memory speciﬁcation do not show up as
axioms in the PVS formalization, hence they do not aﬀect consistency. Instead, any
use of a plain-memory property in a proof will spawn a subgoal requiring the proof
of the plain-memory axioms. The plain-memory signature is deﬁned as follows:
Plain Memory : Type = [#
mem : Memory struct[State], % see page 5
states : PRED[State], % states fulﬁlling the plain memory properties
ro addr : PRED[Address], % read−blessed addresses
rw addr : PRED[Address] % write−blessed addresses
#]
The properties of plain memory are speciﬁed as follows.
plain memory?(pm) : bool =
unchanged memory invariant?(pm‘mem, pm‘states,
union( all permitted state transformers except write access to pm‘rw addr ),
union(pm‘ro addr, pm‘rw addr)) ∧
unchanged memory invariant?(pm‘mem, pm‘states,
memory write transformers(pm‘mem, pm‘rw addr),
pm‘ro addr) ∧
unchanged memory write invariant?(pm‘mem, pm‘states, pm‘rw addr) ∧
changed memory invariant?(pm‘mem, pm‘states, pm‘rw addr) ∧
transformers ok?(pm‘states,
union( all permitted state transformers )) ∧
side eﬀect content unchanged(union(pm‘ro addr, pm‘rw addr), pm‘states,
memory read side eﬀect(pm‘mem)) ∧
side eﬀect content unchanged(pm‘rw addr, pm‘states,
memory write side eﬀect(pm‘mem))
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We have omitted the involved expression for the union of all permitted state trans-
formers. This set contains all read accesses to read- and read/write-blessed ad-
dresses, all write accesses to read/write-blessed addresses, and all corresponding
side eﬀects.
The ﬁrst clause states that read accesses to blessed addresses and all possible
side eﬀects do not change the contents of any of the blessed addresses. The second
clause expresses the same for write accesses and the read-blessed addresses. The
third clause requires that a write access to one address leaves all other read/write-
blessed addresses intact. The fourth clause states that write accesses actually change
the written address in the right way. The utility predicates used in the ﬁrst four
clauses additionally require that the set of states forms an invariant with respect
to the respective set of state transformers. This makes the plain-memory property
an invariant: permitted state transformers must stay in the set of plain-memory
states, in which all the nice properties hold. The ﬁfth clause makes all memory
accesses terminate with OK (which prohibits e.g. unhandled page-faults). The last
two clauses require that side eﬀects do not change the data read or written.
The plain-memory speciﬁcation entails that only explicit writes change a memory
cell. This property enables us to prove the following lemma.
plain memory read write other res : Lemma
plain memory?(pm) ∧
pm‘states(s) ∧
in blessed memory?(dt1, addr1, pm‘rw addr) ∧
in blessed memory?(dt2, addr2, union(pm‘ro addr, pm‘rw addr)) ∧
blocks disjoint?(addr1, size(uidt(dt1)), addr2, size(uidt(dt2))) ∧
valid in mem(pm,dt2)(addr2)(s)
=⇒
data( (write data(pm,dt1)(addr1, data1) ##
read data(pm,dt2)(addr2))(s) )
=
data( read data(pm,dt2)(addr2)(s) )
It expresses that for two variables of type dt1 and dt2 that lie disjoint in blessed
memory, writing the ﬁrst one does not change the contents of the second. This
lemma is used in a rewrite engine that enables PVS to symbolically compute the
value of a variable by going back to the last write access to that variable.
Our hardware model contains physical memory (RAM) as a base of all memory
models. Physical memory provides one byte of storage for every address up to a
certain maximum. Accesses above the maximum yield Fatal as result. Unsurpris-
ingly we can prove that all states of physical memory form a plain memory, with
all addresses below the maximum read/write-blessed.
Our model of linear memory contains page-table based address translation, but
no TLB or page-fault handler yet. The linear memory is stacked on top of a plain
memory using the general memory-structure interface (see Section 4.2 for more
on the stacking of memory models). This plain memory is typically instantiated
with physical memory (possibly containing devices). We have shown in PVS that
the plain-memory properties are obtained for linear memory under the following
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preconditions:
• The code segment register (CS), determining the code privilege level, the page-
table base register, and the page tables themselves remain unchanged (with the
exception of access bits).
• Any translation for read or execute accesses succeeds for the entire blessed range
of virtual addresses. Translations for writes succeed for the writable subset.
• Blessed writable virtual addresses map to blessed writable physical addresses,
blessed read-only addresses map to blessed readable or writable physical ad-
dresses.
• Page tables reside in a memory area that is disjoint from the targets of the above
mappings.
• There is no blessed shared-memory alias to a writable virtual address. (Virtual
read-only regions may be shared arbitrarily.)
One point to highlight is that we only have to require those page-table entries
to remain unchanged that are used in the translation of the virtual blessed address
range. This allows us to modify unrelated page-table entries without loosing the
blessing properties. We achieve this by requiring
disjoint?(virt to phys range(s, union(pm‘ro addr, pm‘rw addr)),
address in pt range?(s, union(pm‘ro addr, pm‘rw addr))),
where virt to phys range translates all addresses in the virtual blessed address range,
and address in pt range? returns the corresponding physical addresses containing the
page-table entries for this range.
4 Memory-Mapped Devices and Reserved Bits
Although most device drivers reside outside the micro-hypervisor, some devices
(e.g. the interrupt controller) must remain under kernel control to prevent malicious
code from monopolizing the system. To program these devices, the micro-hypervisor
code accesses certain device registers. Unlike normal RAM, these registers show
very special behavior when accessed. Special-purpose processor registers (such as
the IA32 control registers [IA32-3a-2.5] 9 ) are similar to device registers in that read
or write accesses to them may cause special eﬀects. For our veriﬁcation attempt,
the following special eﬀects are important.
Reserved bits The value of reserved bits must not be modiﬁed, or otherwise the
processor behavior is undeﬁned. For example, bits 0–2 and bits 5–11 of the IA32
page-table base register (CR3) are reserved [IA32-3a-2.5].
Access type restrictions Some device registers are read-only respectively write-
only accessible, or they allow no instructions to be fetched. ROM is a prominent
example of a read-only accessible device.
9 The notation [IA32-3a-2.5] refers to Volume 3a, Section 2.5 of the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures
Software Developer’s Manual [4].
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Alignment restrictions Some devices require that registers are accessed only
at certain oﬀsets relative to the register base address. Furthermore, each access
must read or write a certain amount of data at once. For example, the registers
of the IA32 advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC) are aligned on
16-byte boundaries. They must be accessed with 4-byte wide and 4-byte aligned
reads and writes [IA32-3a-8.4.1].
Side eﬀects Reading or writing causes side eﬀects on some devices. For exam-
ple, writing to the IA32 APIC end of interrupt register signals completion of
the interrupt-handling procedure [IA32-3a-8.8.5]. This may cause the immediate
delivery of the next pending interrupt.
More abstractly, we can summarize these behaviors as follows: reading and
writing certain registers and certain locations in memory may result in modiﬁcations
to the system state, to the memory (or register) contents, and to the value read or
written. Furthermore, the behavior of an operation may be undeﬁned; in this case
the veriﬁcation should fail.
4.1 Modeling Devices and Reserved Bits
Instead of modeling memory and additional devices as parallel abstract ma-
chines, we prefer the following approach. We extend the Memory struct of
each memory model with two side-eﬀect transformers memory read side eﬀect and
memory write side eﬀect of the following type:
Address, list[Byte], bool → [State →ExprResult[State, list[Byte]]].
Unlike memory read and memory write, these side-eﬀect transformers take the entire
list of bytes read from (or written to) the given address. This is necessary to enforce
alignment restrictions, which require knowledge about the amount of data that is
read (respectively written) at once. The third parameter is an indicator whether
the access crossed a page boundary in a higher virtual memory layer. We elaborate
on the use of this parameter in Section 4.2.
In the following we use a simple memory-mapped random number genera-
tor (RNG) to illustrate how one can model side eﬀects and access restrictions. The
RNG device provides one read-only memory-mapped register, rnd val, that con-
tains an unspeciﬁed (supposedly “random”) value. The internal state of the device
(which is kept in addition to the memory state) contains two natural numbers seed
and access count. The value of access count is incremented as a side eﬀect with each
memory access. The seed is left unspeciﬁed.
To obtain the random value we apply a completely unspeciﬁed function random
to the seed and the current access count. Because access count is strictly increasing,
we get potentially diﬀerent values for every access to rnd val. Under-speciﬁed and
non-deterministic behavior of more complicated devices can be modeled in a similar
fashion.
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4.1.1 Access Type and Alignment Restrictions
Modeling devices with access-type and alignment restrictions is straightforward by
checking these restrictions for overlapping accesses. As an example, we impose that
rnd val must be accessed with machine-word granularity (as unsigned int).
unaligned access(a : Address, bl : list[Byte], cp : bool) :
[Random device memory →ExprResult[Random device memory, list[Byte]]] =
If disjoint?(address block(a, length(bl)), address block(rnd val, size(uidt(dt uint)))) ∨
(¬ cp ∧ length(bl) = size(uidt(dt uint)) ∧ a = rnd val)
Then ok result(bl)
Else fatal result Endif
Here size(uidt(dt uint)) comes from the C++ data-type model and gives the number
of bytes of an unsigned int (which is usually 4 on the IA32 architecture, although
this may vary with the C++ implementation). To require the read-only behavior
of rnd val we use the following after the above alignment check has been passed:
write rnd dev(a : Address, bl : list[Byte], cp : bool) :
[Random device memory →ExprResult[Random device memory, list[Byte]]] =
If a = rnd val
Then fatal result
Else ok result(bl) Endif
The memory read side eﬀect and memory write side eﬀect transformers of the
RNG device are set to compositions of the above two transformers and other checks,
which we discuss below.
4.1.2 Reserved Bits
Reserved-bit restrictions come in two ﬂavors, depending on whether the value of
reserved bits is speciﬁed. For example, the IA32 processor manuals [IA32-3a-2.5]
specify bits 11–31 of the CR4 register as reserved. The value of these bits must be 0.
As long as the value of reserved bits is speciﬁed, we merely have to check that the
value in the byte list passed to the memory write side eﬀect transformer is according
to the speciﬁcation. Registers whose reserved bits all have speciﬁed values can then
be modiﬁed simply by writing to these registers.
Other special-purpose processor registers and device registers leave the value of
certain reserved bits undeﬁned. In this case we match against an unspeciﬁed value
in the memory write side eﬀect transformer. Because the initial register contents
are not speciﬁed, we can establish that reserved bits are unaltered by a write access
only when the written data originates from a previous read of this register.
Reserved bits can also be used to restrict the processor modes in which the
micro-hypervisor may execute. For example, we ﬁx the mode bits in the IA32
control registers CR0 and CR4 to the setting for 32-bit paged, protected mode. This
prevents the kernel from switching back to real mode. Consequently it suﬃces to
model only those parts of real mode that are required for the veriﬁcation of the
kernel’s boot-strapping code.
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4.1.3 Side Eﬀects
Side eﬀects on reads (respectively on writes) cause additional parts of the system
state to be updated. Here, one can either update the memory state itself, or add
an additional device state. For the random number generator, we decided to use
the latter approach. As described earlier, our RNG device implements a side eﬀect
to count all memory accesses in its internal state.
access count(a : Address, bl : list[Byte], cp : bool)(s) :
ExprResult[Random device memory, list[Byte]] =
OK(increase access count(s)(length(bl)), bl)
Another side-eﬀect transformer generates the “random” (i.e. unspeciﬁed) value
when the rnd val register is read.
random : [nat, nat →{ l : list[Byte] | length(l) = size(uidt(dt uint)) }]
read rnd val(a : Address, bl : list[Byte], cp : bool) :
[Random device memory →ExprResult[Random device memory, list[Byte]]] =
If a = rnd val
Then λ(s : Random device memory) :
ok result(random(seed(s), access count(s))(s)
Else ok result(bl) Endif
4.2 Stacking Memory Layers
For greater modularity we split diﬀerent hardware features into separate memory
models where possible. For instance, segment based and page-table based address
translation (which are both part of the virtual memory in the IA32 architecture) can
nevertheless be split into two independent memory models. To obtain the overall
eﬀect we stack diﬀerent memory models, exploiting the general memory struct inter-
face. Every memory layer performs its functionality before invoking the underlying
layer via the abstract interface. The bottom layer is a model of physical memory
that contains a byte array to store the memory contents.
A good example of the stacking of memory layers is provided by linear memory,
which adds page-table based address translation to an underlying physical memory.
In order to keep the stacking ﬂexible, the linear memory is not based on our model
of physical memory directly, but is instead parameterized with an arbitrary plain-
memory model pm. (This model can be instantiated with physical memory, and with
any other memory model that satisﬁes the plain-memory properties.) The linear
memory layer deﬁnes page-table based lookup and address translation as described
for 32-bit page tables in [IA32-3a-3.7]. Finally it deﬁnes functions for ﬁlling the
memory struct of the linear memory model. The function for memory read is given
by
linear read(a : Address) : [Linear memory →ExprResult[Linear memory, Byte]] =
If in memory(max linear)(a) Then
If Mem?(type of(a)) Then
linear resolve(a, Read) ## λ(pa : Address) : memory read(pm‘mem)(pa)
Else
memory read(pm‘mem)(a)
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Physical/Device Memory
Virtual Memory
APIC
Fig. 3. Splitting of side eﬀects when stacking virtual memory on top of device memory.
Endif
Else fatal result Endif
The state-space type Linear memory is equal to the state space of the plain-memory
parameter pm. The function linear read ﬁrst checks if the access is within the mem-
ory or register bounds. For a real memory access, the virtual address a is then
translated into a physical address pa, which is used to access the underlying mem-
ory of pm. Any abnormal result of the address translation (because of page faults
or data-type errors in a page table) is propagated to the outside via the composi-
tion of state transformers, ##. Register accesses are passed to pm without address
translation, of course.
Our random number generator from the previous section was also implemented
as an independent memory layer, which adds the functionality of the RNG device
to the underlying memory layer.
However, when combining virtual memory with memory-mapped devices, one
must deal with new problems. The virtual memory performs address translation and
may thereby split an access to a contiguous block of memory into several accesses
to noncontiguous blocks. By coincidence the splitting might result in an access
to a memory-mapped device that seemingly satisﬁes all alignment and granularity
requirements of the device. For instance, in Figure 3 the very last piece of the
virtual address block is mapped precisely to the ﬁrst APIC register. We view such
an access as an error, because it is only part of a larger memory access. Moreover,
the IA32 architecture gives no guarantees that in the case depicted in Figure 3 the
access to the APIC is performed with 4-byte granularity [IA32-3a-7.1.1], as required
by the APIC.
To detect this kind of error, we introduce a crossed-page indicator cp as argument
to our side-eﬀect transformers. Initially being false, this indicator is set to true
when the address translation splits a contiguous memory access. The side eﬀect
transformer unaligned access (see page 12) of our RNG device always checks the
cp ﬂag and delivers an error if it is true.
5 Example Veriﬁcation
To illustrate how kernel-code veriﬁcation works in our environment, we have proved
two partial correctness properties of a simple linear search (in an array of N unsigned
integers) in PVS. The C++ implementation of the search algorithm uses pointers
and pointer arithmetic:
unsigned int a[N], value;
unsigned int ∗ﬁrst = &a[0];
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unsigned int ∗last = &a[N];
unsigned int ∗current;
current = ﬁrst;
while(current < last) {
if (∗current == value) break;
current++;
}
More precisely, we have shown that the current pointer refers to an array element
containing the search value if the value is contained in the array, and to the element
one beyond the array bounds (last) if no such element is present. The veriﬁcation of
these properties proceeds according to the approach that was outlined in Figure 2
on page 3. First, (1) the C++ sources for the search program are translated into
their semantics in PVS. Second, (2) the correctness properties are formulated as pre-
and postconditions, and then veriﬁed against the plain-memory speciﬁcation. Our
veriﬁcation thus shows that, under suitable assumptions, the example program runs
correctly both in physical and virtual memory. Finally, to avoid vacuous results,
(3) the plain-memory preconditions were validated for concrete stacks of memory
models (e.g. linear memory on top of the RNG device on top of physical memory).
Because we have established parts (2) and (3) separately, changing the under-
lying hardware/memory model only requires that one repeats the validation of the
plain-memory assumptions (part (3)) for the new memory model.
5.1 C++ to Semantics Translation
The semantics compiler translates the above C++ code into its PVS semantics.
Expression-to-statement and lvalue-to-rvalue conversions are made explicit. We
only show the translation of the second part (lines 6–10) of the above code snippet.
e2s[State, Address, Semantics void]
(assign(pm, dt pointer)(id(current), l2r(pm, dt pointer)(id(ﬁrst)))) ##
while(l2r(pm, dt pointer)(id(current)) < l2r(pm, dt pointer)(id(last)),
if else(
l2r(pm, dt uint)(deref(pm)(l2r(pm, dt pointer)(id(current)))) == literal(value),
break,
skip) ##
e2s[State, Semantics pointer, Semantics void](postinc(pm)(id(current)))),
Here ﬁrst, last and current are addresses of disjointly allocated pointer variables.
Currently we require disjointness of these variables in a precondition, but once the
formalization of memory allocation is complete, disjointness will be derived from
the allocator model.
5.2 Veriﬁcation Against the Plain-Memory Abstraction
Veriﬁcation is currently done by automatic loop unrolling and simpliﬁcation ac-
cording to the plain-memory rewriting rules. For this, the necessary preconditions
in blessed memory and valid in mem for not previously written variables have been
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added to the precondition. in blessed memory states that the variable is correctly
allocated in blessed memory, valid in mem that the memory contains a valid bit rep-
resentation for the variable. Typically the latter is established by a previous write
to this variable.
In our C++ semantics, all expressions and most statements are ex-
pressed using a combination of only four diﬀerent state transformers:
read data, write data, ok result(data) (which returns OK(s, data)), and fatal result
(which produces Fatal). It is therefore possible to simplify expressions by ﬁrst
expanding them to sequences of these transformers, and then simplifying these
sequences using the plain-memory rewriting rules (e.g. the rule in Section 3).
Similarly, we evaluate statements up to the point where only expressions remain
in the code sequence. For example, under the precondition OK?((expr ## b ex)(s))
the sequence
(e2s(expr) ## if else(b ex, stmt if, stmt else))(s)
is rewritten into
(e2s(expr ## b ex) ## If data(expr ## b ex)(s) Then stmt if Else stmt else Endif)(s)
This simpliﬁes with an appropriate rewriting rule for e2s to either
expr ## b ex ## stmt if or to expr ## b ex ## stmt else, depending on the
value of data((expr ## b ex)(s)). Likewise, we rewrite the statements stmt if and
stmt else to expression sequences containing only read data, write data, and the
above result transformers. Because of this transformation it suﬃces to deﬁne and
prove the plain-memory rewriting rules only for data reads and writes. All other
rules of the rewriting system operate independently from the data-type or memory
model.
5.3 Establishing Plain Memory
For each memory model we established the plain-memory property for a certain
range of addresses. As stated above, for physical memory this is the entire address
range. Stacked models contain preconditions which require the blessed address
range to be contained in the blessed range of the underlying memory model. It
is therefore suﬃcient to show that the addresses used in the code to be veriﬁed
all reside in blessed memory. Accesses outside the blessed-memory address range
automatically violate the plain-memory assumption and cannot be simpliﬁed with
the plain-memory rewriting rules. In such a case the plain-memory property must
be reestablished before one can proceed with the automatic simpliﬁcation.
For our veriﬁcation example, one needs the following preconditions:
• The variables are allocated so that they do not overlap with the registers of the
random device.
• The variables are allocated so that they do not overlap with a page-table entry
used to access some of the variables.
• All page-table entries of these variables are writable (because reference bits may
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be written back to memory).
• The memory of current is not virtually aliased with any of the other variables
used in the search program.
Note that it is possible to have virtual aliases in the array or for the ﬁrst and last
pointers, as these are read only.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented two details of our approach to model the memory
of an IA32 system. The ﬁrst detail is a speciﬁcation of well-behaved plain mem-
ory. This speciﬁcation allows us to maintain an abstract level of reasoning with
reasonable eﬃciency on top of a complex model of paged virtual memory. The sec-
ond detail is our modeling of memory-mapped devices and reserved bit restrictions.
We use side-eﬀect state transformers that are performed before and after memory
access to uniformly model both, reserved bits and memory-mapped devices. As
demonstrations we have included the formalization of a (memory-mapped) random
number generator, and an example veriﬁcation of a simple C++ code fragment.
Related Work. There have been extensive attempts to reconcile the untyped
memory model of C with a typed view, see e.g. [10]. At the other end of the spec-
trum, complete micro-processors have been formally veriﬁed at the gate level [1].
Our current work is located in-between those eﬀorts. We take a correct IA32 pro-
cessor for granted. Our aim then is to establish that the view on memory provided
by the Robin micro-hypervisor, despite various peculiarities present in the architec-
ture’s hardware (virtual vs. physical memory, memory-mapped devices, etc.), is a
model of C++ memory, which is well-behaved in the sense that one does not need
to worry about low-level features like virtual address aliasing anymore. Perhaps
most closely related is the veriﬁcation of page table algorithms in [9], which still
uses a rather abstract memory model however.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions.
References
[1] Beyer, S., C. Jacobi, D. Kro¨ning, D. Leinenbach and W. J. Paul, Putting it all together—formal
veriﬁcation of the VAMP, STTT Journal, Special Issue on Recent Advances in Hardware Veriﬁcation
8 (2006), pp. 411–430.
[2] Hohmuth, M. and H. Tews, The semantics of C++ data types: Towards verifying low-level system
components, in: D. Basin and B. Wolﬀ, editors, 16th International Conference on Theorem Proving
in Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs 2003). Emerging Trends Proceedings (2003), pp. 127–144, technical
Report No. 187.
[3] Huisman, M. and B. Jacobs, Java program veriﬁcation via a Hoare logic with abrupt termination, in:
T. Maibaum, editor, Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1783 (2000), pp. 284–303.
H. Tews et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 79–96 95
[4] Intel Corporation, Denver, CO, “Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual,” (2007),
order Number: 25366[5-9]-023US.
[5] Owre, S., S. Rajan, J. Rushby, N. Shankar and M. Srivas, PVS: Combining speciﬁcation, proof checking,
and model checking, in: R. Alur and T. Henzinger, editors, Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science 1102 (1996), pp. 411–414.
[6] Tews, H., Micro hypervisor veriﬁcation: Possible approaches and relevant properties, in: NLUUG
Voorjaarsconferentie 2007: Virtualisatie, 2007, pp. 96–109.
[7] Tews, H., Olmar: manipulating C and C++ abstract syntax trees in OCaml, in: H. Tews, editor,
Proceedings of the C/C++ Veriﬁcation Workshop, 2007, pp. 103–113, technical report ICIS-R07015,
Radboud University Nijmegen.
[8] Tews, H., B. Jacobs, E. Poll, M. van Eekelen and P. van Rossum, Speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of the Nova microhypervisor (2007), deliverable D.6 of the Robin project, available at
http://www.cs.ru.nl/~tews.
[9] Tuch, H. and G. Klein, Verifying the L4 virtual memory subsystem, in: G. Klein, editor, Proc. NICTA
Formal Methods Workshop on Operating Systems Veriﬁcation, NICTA Technical Report 0401005T-1
(2004), pp. 73–97.
[10] Tuch, H., G. Klein and M. Norrish, Types, bytes, and separation logic, in: M. Hofmann and M. Felleisen,
editors, Proc. 34th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages
(POPL’07), Nice, France, 2007, pp. 97–108.
H. Tews et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 217 (2008) 79–9696
